Preemption under the Federal Railway Safety Act: Death of a Plaintiff\u27s Cause of Action? by Gianvito, Nicholas
Duquesne Law Review 
Volume 30 Number 4 Article 6 
1992 
Preemption under the Federal Railway Safety Act: Death of a 
Plaintiff's Cause of Action? 
Nicholas Gianvito 
Follow this and additional works at: https://dsc.duq.edu/dlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Nicholas Gianvito, Preemption under the Federal Railway Safety Act: Death of a Plaintiff's Cause of 
Action?, 30 Duq. L. Rev. 927 (1992). 
Available at: https://dsc.duq.edu/dlr/vol30/iss4/6 
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by Duquesne Scholarship Collection. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Duquesne Law Review by an authorized editor of Duquesne Scholarship Collection. 
Preemption Under the Federal Railway Safety Act:
Death of a Plaintiff's Cause of Action?
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1970 Congress enacted the Federal Railway Safety Act (here-
inafter "FRSA").' The purpose of the FRSA was "to promote
safety in all areas of railroad operations and to reduce railroad-
related accidents, and to reduce deaths and injuries to per-
sons .... "I Ironically, the FRSA has been recently utilized by
defendants to defeat common law claims of negligence brought
against railroads. The typical scenario goes something like this:
plaintiff is injured in a grade crossing accident. She files suit alleg-
ing that the railroad was negligent in failing to provide sufficient
warning signs or devices, failing to provide sufficient warning of an
approaching train, and failing to maintain its right of way to allow
sufficient sight and/or hearing distance so as to warn the plaintiff
of an approaching train. Defense counsel moves for partial sum-
mary judgment on these issues, asserting preemption under the
FRSA.3 The gist of defendant's motion is that, with respect to the
sufficiency or adequacy of railroad crossings, responsibility and the
concomitant duty of maintenance has been preemptively assumed
by the federal government. In turn, certain regulatory functions
have been reserved for the states.4 That is, it is the duty of the
state, not the railroad, to survey grade crossings and identify the
need for protective devices and to implement a schedule of
projects to accomplish this. Therefore, the defense argues, the rail-
road has no duty to the plaintiff injured as a result of a defective
1. 45 USC § 421 et seq (1970).
2. 45 USC § 421 (1970).
3. Most commonly, the preemption argument is raised at the summary judgment
stage. However, it may also be raised as a defense or in a motion to dismiss. Charles F.
Preuss, Federal Preemption of State Tort Actions: When and How, Def Couns J 434, 444
(Oct 1990).
4. See Highways, 23 USC § 130(d) (1987), which provides:
Each State shall conduct and systematically maintain a survey of all highways to
identify those railroad crossings which may require separation, relocation, or protec-




railroad crossing. Absent a duty owed by the defendant, there can
be no finding of negligence.
The scope of this comment is to provide an insight into the legit-
imacy of these preemption claims. The comment will begin with
the early railroad liability cases, setting the stage for grade crossing
negligence cases. Attention will then be focused upon the FRSA
itself, followed by an analysis of the cases which have interpreted
the Act's preemptive effect. In concluding, an assessment will be
made of the various advantages and disadvantages of preemption
of common law state negligence claims.
II. HISTORY OF RAILROAD LIABILITY
Railroad companies first raised the defense of compliance with
government standards over a century ago.5 It was during this pe-
riod that the federal government first began to systematically regu-
late the railroads. However, the courts refused to exonerate the
railroad companies from liability simply because they complied
with the minimum statutory requirements.'
In Grand Trunk Ry. Co. v Ives,7 the Supreme Court of the
United States was faced with the issue of compliance with govern-
ment standards as a defense to tort liability. At the outset of its
analysis, the Court opined that issues of railroad crossing accident
cases are necessarily fact sensitive." Therefore, the Court held that
the jury should determine the issue of the railroad's negligence.'
In discussing the issue of regulatory compliance, the Court noted
that most states had ruled that railroads could be held liable for
negligence, even though they had fully complied with statutes pre-
scribing signals to be given and other precautions to be taken.'0
The reason for the state courts' refusal to permit this defense is
well grounded in the common law principle that "every one must
so conduct himself and use his own property as that, under ordi-
nary circumstances, he will not injure another in any way."'-
As a result of these decisions, the common law rule that compli-
5. See, for example, Chicago, Burlington and Quincy R.R. Co. v Perkins, 125 11 127,
17 NE 1 (1888), and Thompson v New York R.R., 110 NY 636, 17 NE 690 (1888).
6. Id. "The fact that the statute may provide one precaution does not relieve the
company from adopting such others as public safety and common prudence may dictate."
Chicago, 17 NE at 5.
7. 144 US 408 (1892).
8. Grand Trunk Ry. Co., 144 US at 420.
9. Id at 427.
10. Id at 420-21.
11. Id at 421.
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ance with government standards establishes only minimum stan-
dards developed fairly early and continued for nearly a century.12
However, beginning in the 1980s, courts began to hold that the
FRSA preempted the field of railroad regulation and that compli-
ance with regulations promulgated under the FRSA exonerated
railroad companies from liability.'3
III. THE FRSA
As noted at the outset, the purpose of the FRSA is set forth in
Section 421 of the Act, which provides:
The Congress declares that the purpose of this chapter is to promote safety
in all areas of railroad operations and to reduce railroad-related accidents,
and to reduce deaths and injuries to persons and to reduce damage to prop-
erty caused by accidents involving any carrier of hazardous materials.
14
The FRSA further empowers the secretary of transportation to
prescribe appropriate rules, regulations, orders, and standards for
all areas of railroad safety. 5 The Act also provides for a compre-
hensive study to be made as a means of eliminating and protecting
railroad grade crossings.' 6 Pursuant to this authority, the secretary
of transportation has issued various regulations" specifying the re-
quirements, duties, and responsibilities imposed upon the states as
to railroad grade crossing safety. These regulations also include the
vesting of responsibility in the public authorities as to the need
for, and selection of, highway warning devices.'8 These regulations
12. For subsequent cases following Grand Trunk Ry. Co., see, for example, Southern
Pacific R.R. Co. v Mitchell, 80 Ariz 50, 292 P2d 827 (1956), and New York Central R.R. Co.
v Chernew, 285 F2d 189 (8th Cir 1960).
13. See Marshall v Burlington Northern, Inc., 720 F2d 1149 (9th Cir 1983).
14. 45 USC § 421 (1970).
15. 45 USC § 431 (1970).
16. 45 USC § 433 (1970). It is clear that the issue of grade crossing safety was a prime
concern of Congress. This concern is set forth in the legislative history of the Act, where the
House Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee stated that:
It is aware that grade crossing accidents constitute one of the major causes of fatali-
ties connected with rail operations. The need to do something about these terrible
accidents which have one of the highest incidents of death and injury per accident,
necessitates an immediate attack on the grade crossing problem as soon as possible.
HR Rep No 1194, 91st Cong, 2nd Sess 11 (1970), reprinted in 1970 US Code Cong & Admin
News 4104, 4116 (1970).
17. See 23 CFR § 646.200 et seq (1975). See also 23 CFR § 655.601(a) (1983), which
adopted the "Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices for Streets and Highways" (here-
inafter "MUTCD").
18. Part VIII of MUTCD (which deals with traffic control systems for railroad-high-
way crossings) provides:
8a-1 Functions. The determination of need and selection of devices at a grade cross-
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provide the foundation for the railroad companies' assertion that
the common law duty of maintenance has been preemptively as-
sumed by the federal government.
Perhaps the most fatal provision for a plaintiff's case is Section
434 of the FRSA, which provides:
The Congress declares that laws, rules, regulations, orders and standards
relating to railroad safety shall be nationally uniform to the extent practi-
cable. A State may adopt or continue in force any law ... relating to rail-
road safety until such time as the Secretary has adopted a rule ... covering
the subject matter of such State requirement. A State may adopt or con-
tinue in force an additional or more stringent law ... relating to railroad
safety when necessary to eliminate or reduce an essentially local safety haz-
ard, and when not incompatible with any Federal law... and when not
creating an undue burden on interstate commerce.'9
Section 434 provides the basis for which some courts have held
that the FRSA prevents not only state regulation in the field but
also state common law tort claims.20
IV. THE TEST FOR FEDERAL PREEMPTION
Under the Supreme Court's most recent test for federal preemp-
tion,21 state law is preempted under the Supremacy Clause 2 in
three circumstances. First, Congress can explicitly define the ex-
tent to which the FRSA preempts state law.23 Second, state law is
preempted where it regulates conduct in a field that Congress in-
tended the federal government to occupy exclusively.24 Finally,
state law is preempted to the extent it actually conflicts with fed-
eral law.25 Courts that upheld preemption of tort claims under the
ing is made by the public agency with jurisdictional authority. Subject to such deter-
mination and selection, the design, installation, and operation shall be in accordance
with the national standards contained herein. [page 8A-1]. 8D-1 Selection of Systems
and Devices. The selection of traffic control devices at a grade crossing is determined
by public agencies having jurisdictional responsibility at specific locations ....
Based on an engineering and traffic investigation, a determination is made whether
any active control system is required at a crossing and, if so, what type is appropriate.
19. 45 USC § 434 (1970) (emphasis added).
20. See, for example, Armijo v Atchison, Topeka, and Santa Fe Ry. Co., 754 F Supp
1526 (D NM 1990), Hatfield v Burlington Northern R.R. Co., 757 F Supp 1198 (D Kan
1991), and Marshall v Burlington Northern, Inc., 720 F2d 1149 (9th Cir 1983).
21. English v General Electric Co., 496 US 72 (1990).
22. US Const, Art VI, cl 2.
23. English, 496 US at 78.
24. Id at 79. This occurs where federal regulation in the field is pervasive. However,
where the regulations are in an area traditionally occupied by the states, congressional in-




FRSA have done so under the first circumstance, based upon the
explicit language set forth in Section 434 of the statute.2 6
V. COURT DECISIONS INTERPRETING THE FRSA's PREEMPTIVE
EFFECT
In the early 1980s, courts first began to recognize preemption
under the FRSA as a defense to negligence claims brought against
railroads. 27 However, the opinions in the federal circuits are diver-
gent as to the effect and extent of preemption.28 Over the past dec-
ade, a pattern has developed whereby the decisions dealing with
preemption under the FRSA may be divided into three categories:
(1) strict preemption, (2) no preemption, and (3) contingent
preemption.29
A. Strict Preemption
To date, only one federal court has applied the principle of strict
preemption." In Armijo v Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Ry.
Co.,31 a district court in New Mexico found that, with regard to the
installation of warning devices, the FRSA explicitly preempted
state law.3 2 Although no administrative decision had been made re-
garding the crossing in question, the court based its decision on the
Railroad-Highway Projects regulations outlined in the Code of
Federal Regulations3 3 and the adoption of the Manual on Uniform
Traffic Control Devices.3 As a result, the court held that any state
common law duty imposed upon the railroad with respect to warn-
ing devices at grade crossings had been preempted by federal law.3 5
In turn, the responsibility and authority for determining the need
for and selection of crossing signals had been delegated to the ap-
26. See Armijo, 754 F Supp at 1530, and Hatfield, 757 F Supp at 1202.
27. See, for example, Marshall v Burlington Northern, Inc., 720 F2d 1149 (9th Cir
1983).
28. See Karl v Burlington Northern R.R. Co., 880 F2d 68 (8th Cir 1989) (no preemp-
tion); Marshall, 720 F2d at 1153 (preemption does not occur until the appropriate agency
has made a decision regarding the adequacy of the crossing in question); Armijo, 754 F
Supp at 1530 (complete preemption).
29. Hatfield, 757 F Supp at 1205.
30. Armijo, 754 F Supp at 1526. It should be noted, however, that the court in
Armijo alternately relies upon the contingent preemption rationale, discussed infra. Id at
1531-32.
31. 754 F Supp 1526 (D NM 1990).
32. Armijo, 754 F Supp at 1531. The court referred to Section 434 of the FRSA.
33. 23 CFR § 646.200 et seq (1975).
34. See note 18.





At the other end of the spectrum lies the argument that there is
no preemption of common law negligence claims under the FRSA.
Under this theory, summary judgment will be denied even if the
public agency with jurisdictional authority has made a determina-
tion of the adequacy of warning devices at the situs of the tort.
Courts following this theory rely upon the common law principle
that compliance with a legislative enactment or administrative reg-
ulation does not necessarily prevent a finding of negligence where a
reasonable man would take additional precautions.3 7
The Eighth Circuit followed this view in Karl v Burlington
Northern RR. Co.3 8 In Karl, the plaintiff brought a negligence ac-
tion against the railroad for injuries sustained at a crossing colli-
sion. 9 The defendant railroad argued that it had no duty to up-
grade its warning devices because the appropriate public agency
had already approved the warning devices at the crossing in ques-
tion.40 The court, in declining to adopt Burlington's preemption ar-
gument, asserted that the FRSA merely represents an effort by the
federal government to improve the safety of grade crossings and
does not lessen the statutory or common law duty to maintain a
"good and safe" crossing.41 Burlington further argued that since it
had complied with all statutory safety requirements, it should not
be liable for negligence.42 The court answered this contention by
citing Section 288C of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which
provides that "compliance with a legislative enactment or an ad-
ministrative regulation does not prevent a finding of negligence
where a reasonable man would take additional precautions. '43
Thus, the railroad was held liable for failing to upgrade warning
devices at the crossing.44
36. Id. The state's Public Service Commission is vested with the responsibility of
determining grade crossing safety. In Pennsylvania, the Public Utility Commission has ex-
clusive jurisdiction over highway-rail crossing proceedings. Philadelphia v PA Public Utility
Comm., 91 Pa Cmwlth 923, 496 A2d 924 (1985).
37. See Karl, 880 F2d at 76.
38. 880 F2d 68 (8th Cir 1989).
39. Karl, 880 F2d at 69.
40. Id at 75-76.
41. Id at 76.
42. Id.
43. Id, citing the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 288C (1965).
44. Karl, 880 F2d at 70.
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Similarly, a district court in the ninth circuit denied recognition
of the railroad's preemption defense. In Southern Pacific Trans.
Co. v Maga Trucking Co.,45 the trucking company counterclaimed
for damages to its tractor/trailer allegedly caused by the railroad's
negligent maintenance of the crossing.48 The railroad moved for
summary judgment based on federal preemption. 47 The court de-
nied the motion, stating that preemption had been limited to void-
ing state statutes and local ordinances attempting to regulate spe-
cific areas governed by federal regulations.48 Additionally, the
court noted that even if state common law is preempted by the
FRSA, there is no need to foreclose recognition of the federal com-
mon law of negligence.' 9 These cases reaffirm the traditional view
that compliance with government standards is not a defense to tort
liability.50 However, the contingent preemption view has become
the most popular position in the federal courts.
C. Contingent Preemption
Under the contingent preemption view, preemption is condi-
tioned upon a determination by the appropriate agency as to the
adequacy of warning devices at the particular crossing. Until such
a decision is reached, the railroad's common law duty of mainte-
nance of the crossing remains intact.
The leading authority cited for this position is Marshall v Bur-
lington Northern, Inc.5 1 In Marshall, a wrongful death action, the
widow of a motorist killed in a train/truck collision received a jury
verdict in her favor.2 On appeal, the railroad argued that evidence
of the adequacy of the crossing should have been excluded. In
this case, however, the authorized public agency had not made a
determination of the adequacy of the crossing in question.5 4 Decid-
ing that preemption had not yet occurred, the Ninth Circuit held
45. 758 F Supp 608 (D Nev 1991).
46. Southern Pacific Trans. Co., 758 F Supp at 609.
47. Id.
48. Id at 612.
49. Id, citing Urie v Thompson, 337 US 163 (1949), where the Supreme Court held
that "what constitutes negligence [under the Federal Employer's Liability Act] is a federal
question, not varying in accordance with the differing conceptions of negligence applicable
under state and local laws for other purposes." Urie, 337 US at 174.
50. See Section II of this comment.
51. 720 F2d 1149 (9th Cir 1983).
52. Marshall, 720 F2d at 1151.
53. Id at 1154.
54. Id.
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that until a decision is reached, the railroad's duty under applica-
ble state law is to maintain a "good and safe" crossing.5 5 The con-
tingent preemption view has recently been adopted by several dis-
trict courts.56
Although each of these views has merit, they must be examined
in light of the purposes for which the statute was enacted, the
competing interests at stake, and the effect that preemption will
have upon tort claims.
VI. PERSPECTIVE
Although the purpose of the FRSA was to promote safety,57 it is
clear that Congress also sought to prevent "subjecting the national
rail system to non-uniform enforcement in 50 different judicial and
administrative systems. '58 It is through these goals (which some-
times conflict, as this comment illustrates) that one may gain an
insight into the intent of Congress in enacting the FRSA and the
effect that was desired for both the railroad industry and the tort
claimant.
It is clear that defense counsel have a strong argument for pre-
emption. Congress validly exercised its power under the Interstate
Commerce Clause 59 in enacting the FRSA. Furthermore, it is un-
questionable that regulations promulgated under the FRSA super-
sede state regulation under the Supremacy Clause.60 However, the
issue yet to be answered is what constitutes state regulation.
Clearly, legislative enactments and administrative regulations at-
tempting to govern the field of railway safety constitute state regu-
lation. However, tort actions are brought to compensate an injured
plaintiff, not to regulate the railroad industry. Thus, it is a long
leap to conclude that such actions are preempted under the FRSA.
Moreover, it is a time-honored common law principle that com-
pliance with government regulations does notprevent a finding of
55. Id.
56. See, for example, Anderson v Chicago Central and Pacific R.R. Co., 771 F Supp
227 (N D I1 1991) (defendant was granted leave to amend its affirmative defense of federal
preemption to show that local agency had made determination as to appropriate warning
devices); Hatfield, 757 F Supp at 1198 (adopting the Marshall standard); and Easterwood v
CSX Trans. Inc., 742 F Supp 676 (N D Ga 1990) (department of transportation's decision
not to install gate arms constitutes federal decision and thus claim is preempted).
57. 45 USC § 421 (1970).
58. HR Rep No 1194, 91st Cong, 2nd Sess 11 (1970), reprinted in 1970 US Code Cong
& Admin News 4104, 4109 (1971).
59. US Const, Art I, § 8, cl 3.
60. US Const, Art VI, cl 2.
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negligence where a reasonable man would take additional precau-
tions."' In his article, The Role of Regulatory Compliance in Tort
Actions, 2 Paul Dueffert s suggests that defendants' compliance
with strict, complex government regulations should suffice to im-
munize them from liability. However, this view ignores the fact
that each tort case stands on its own facts.64 Thus, the courts
should not place a blanket restriction on all tort claims simply be-
cause of pervasive government regulation.
It may also be suggested that preemption is valid under a public
policy/economic argument-that is, to save the ailing railroad in-
dustry and help the national economy. However, a defense based
on this argument would have a chilling effect on plaintiffs' claims.
How could justice be served if General Motors were permitted to
assert a defense in a products liability case based on the ailing
American car industry? Would it be fair to allow the state to assert
"fiscal problems" as a defense to a claim against it? Moreover,
such an argument goes against the principle of law and economics:
an injured plaintiff should have redress against a negligent
defendant.
Several other principles support the denial of the preemption
defense. Where Congress has legislated in a field of traditional
state regulation, it is assumed that the states' powers were not
meant to be superseded. 5 The assumption that the historic police
powers of the state is not meant to be superseded lies in the Tenth
Amendment of the United States Constitution, which reserves all
powers not specifically granted to the federal government to the
states. Although the federal government has regulated the rail-
roads for decades, it has yet to impose its powers upon state tort
actions.
Additionally, it is axiomatic that legislative enactments in dero-
gation of rights are to be strictly construed. 6 Under this principle,
"no act should be construed as infringing upon such rights except
61. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 288C (1965). See also Section II of this com-
ment. It is interesting to note that the preemption courts did not discuss this issue.
62. 26 Harv J Leg 175 (1989).
63. Law Clerk to the Honorable John R. Gibson, United States Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit; B.A., University of Minnesota, 1985; J.D., Harvard Law School, 1988.
64. For instance, greater care must generally be exercised at crossings in urban areas
than in rural areas. Other factors include the landscape surrounding the crossing and vege-
tative growth.
65. Sun Ship, Inc. v Pennsylvania, 41 Pa Commw 302, 398 A2d 1111, aff'd, 447 US
715 (1980).
66. 73 Am Jur 2d Statutes § 283 (1974).
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by clear, unambiguous, and peremptory language. ' 6 7 One might ar-
gue that Section 434 of the FRSA, which sets forth nationally uni-
form standards, meets this requirement. However, The FRSA ap-
pears to speak only in terms of public law regulation. This is to be
distinguished from private causes of action, such as negligence
claims, about or regarding which the Act is silent. Thus, such neg-
ligence claims should not be barred under an expansive reading of
the FRSA.
Finally, preemption may effectively close the door to recovery on
an injured plaintiff. If the railroad is absolved from liability, there
is only one other entity from which the plaintiff may seek redress:
the state. Thus the plaintiff will be required to overcome an addi-
tional obstacle-that of sovereign immunity.
6 8
VII. CONCLUSION
In concluding, it should be stressed that this comment does not
suggest that all persons injured at grade crossings should be enti-
tled to recovery. Rather, it is merely suggested that a blanket re-
striction should not be placed on a cause of action based upon an
expansive reading of the FRSA. As noted before, tort cases are
necessarily fact sensitive. Thus, a factual determination should
first be made to determine whether the railroad was negligent and
whether such negligence was the proximate cause of the injury. By
taking certain decisions from the jury based upon a legal conclu-
sion, an injured plaintiff may be denied recovery even though the
railroad was at fault. There is nothing in the legislative history or
the FRSA itself to indicate that Congress intended this result.
Nicholas Gianvito
67. Id.
68. Black's Law Dictionary defines sovereign immunity as "A judicial doctrine which
precludes bringing suit against the government without its consent." Black's Law Diction-
ary 1396 (West, 6th ed 1990).
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